I
There has been a widely acknowledged 'religious turn' in recent interpretive accounts of Locke's political thought. 2 An appreciation of the deep theological underpinnings of his moral and political works-initially emphasised in the seminal work of John Dunn 3 -has become increasingly regarded as necessary to their understanding. The importance of this appreciation has been underlined more recently in Jeremy
Waldron's innovative and provocative analysis of the way in which Locke's religious commitments substantively inform his egalitarian philosophical premises and normative prescriptions. 4 The work of Dunn, Waldron and others has revealed numerous problems with previously dominant Straussian and Marxist readings of Locke's political thought; readings that either ignored or explained away the significance of his theological commitments. What the 'religious turn' has revealed, above all, are the problems with regarding Locke as the philosophical father of liberal politics, a view that sits uncomfortably with much of his thought.
One area of interpretation that has been completely transformed by this heightened sensitivity to the religious roots of Locke's thought is his well-known and still influential account of property ownership put forward in the Two Treatises.
Long-established interpretations-often Marxist in origin-that viewed Locke's theory as an ideological justification for 'unlimited capitalist appropriation', the personification of 'possessive individualism', have been thoroughly discredited, replaced by alternative readings that stress the conditions he attaches to property ownership; conditions with a markedly religious character. 5 In fact, it has become increasingly accepted that one of the most crucial conditions that Locke places on ownership is a universal and unconditional entitlement to subsistence provisions, a right that actually trumps established rights of justly owned private property and that derives from his Christian theology.
The nature of this entitlement is, however, rather ambiguous, not only because it does not actually appear in the account of property in chapter V of the Second Treatise, but also because when it is invoked, it is described as a 'right to charity'.
Within contemporary liberal accounts of political morality, charity is customarily regarded as a voluntary transfer from one agent in a position of relative comfort to another in a position of relative indigence. 6 Charity is certainly a moral obligation, but, crucially, it is an imperfect obligation, a supererogatory action that individuals can legitimately opt out of without suffering any significant opprobrium. Acts of charity are, by their very nature, legitimately avoidable. When such acts do take place, they are in recognition of imperfect duties, distinguishable from perfect duties; in liberal accounts of political morality, matters of charity are defined by what they are not, matters of justice.
A. John Simmons rightly points out that Locke's works are 'liberally peppered' with references to charity and that any denial of this can be dismissed as 'odd'. 7 Yet Simmons and other recent Locke scholars deny that it is liberally peppered; that is to say, they reject the claim that the understanding of charity that
Locke deploys is the liberal one of supererogatory moral action but rather a quite different Thomistic understanding. However, this now widely accepted interpretive claim about the Thomistic nature of Lockean charity has been made without sufficient attention to the way in which charity is deployed throughout his writing. Thus, the aim of this article is to try and get to grips with Locke's various usages of charity and determine whether the concept that he deploys is a consistent one and then, on this basis, address its moral and political meaning. 8 We begin by identifying the ambiguous role occupied by charity in Locke's account of property ownership and subsistence rights in the Two Treatises and in other relevant writings on politics and economics. After discussion of this, we move on to examine how Locke defines charity in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, before turning to the crucial position it occupies in his theological corpus. We argue that whilst Locke's understanding of charity and its relationship with justice in his political work seems ultimately fraught with ambiguities, proper attention to the breadth of his corpus reveals these ambiguities to be related to his acceptance and configuration of charity as a disposition rather than a mere act; a configuration that is inextricably linked to his account of toleration.
II
Locke's account of property ownership begins with an original community of goods:
he claims that, initially, God bequeathed the world 'to Mankind in common' and granted no individual an exclusive right of ownership. 9 The way that private property rights emerge from this community of goods is through individual applications of labour on natural resources. 10 The reason that labour is capable of generating such exclusive rights relates to a fundamental moral principle underpinning Locke's thought, the duty to ensure their own preservation that individuals owe to God: 'every one…is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully'. 11 It is this crucial moral obligation of self-preservation that gives the activity of labour real moral force. 12 'It cannot be supposed', Locke explains, that God intended the world to 'remain common and uncultivated', since it was given for human 'benefit'. 13 Therefore, he suggests that when God 'gave the World in common to all Mankind, 
III
Numerous Locke scholars would probably dismiss such a worry as essentially anachronistic: they would regard it as fundamentally mistaken to interpret Locke's deployment of the term 'charity' through the conceptual distinctions associated with contemporary liberal accounts of political morality. This is because the modern liberal conception of charity as supererogatory action was not given systematic expression until the eighteenth century by thinkers such as Adam Smith and the imputation of such an understanding to Locke is to make a basic historical error. Whilst considering the provision of alms to the needy, Smith contended that 'a beggar is an object of our charity and may be said to have a right to demand it-but when we use the word right in this way it is not in a proper but a metaphoricall sense'. 27 In other words, the beggar has a right to our alms, but because it is only an imperfect right, there exists only an imperfect obligation and we can legitimately withhold assistance.
Most recent analysts of this area of Locke's thought seem to implicitly endorse such a charge of anachronism insofar as they assume I: 42 to reveal his brief rehearsal and approval of a medieval and early modern understanding of charity. James Tully, for example, views this passage as evidence of Locke's incorporation of a Thomistic understanding of charity in an attempt to respond to apparent defects in the natural law accounts of property advanced by Grotius and Pufendorf. Unlike Grotius who did not incorporate such a duty and unlike Pufendorf who embedded it in the wider context of property rights based on convention, a charitable obligation for Locke is described by Tully as a 'natural and positive duty' enshrined in natural law. 28 Tully's claim is that Locke's suggestion in this passage is that 'where no means are available for a man to provide for himself, the right to the means of subsistence applies directly to another person's goods….A proprietor who has more than enough to sustain himself is under a positive duty to sustain those who do not'. Thus, 'charity is a right on the part of the needy and a duty on the part of the wealthy'. 29 Tully's claim is that the roots of this idea of charity are markedly Thomistic. 30 Aquinas' understanding of charity, which Tully regards as 'strikingly similar' to that of Locke is expressed in the
Summa theologiae:
Things pertaining to human right cannot take anything away from natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order established by Divine providence, lower things are ordained for the purpose of supplying man's necessities. And so the division and appropriation of such things which proceeds from human law does not cancel out the fact that man's necessities must be supplied by means of those things. And so whatever anyone has in superabundance is due under the natural law to the poor for their succour. 34 and identifies it as a 'doctrine of rights generated by need', which he suggests, 'is set out as explicitly and as generally as could be'. 35 Charity is here again understood as an obligation that is unavoidable; it is not a supererogatory action but one that individuals can actually be bound to by political authority. Indeed, Waldron insists that 'the fact that charity is regarded as a specifically Christian virtue is for
Locke no reason for thinking that it is unenforceable' by government. 36 According to him, at the very least, I: 42 defends 'the view that neither the rich nor civil society on their behalf is entitled to resist the poor when the poor attempt to seize their surplus goods for themselves'. 37 Nevertheless, there is some evidence within Locke's political thought that suggests his idea of charity is not as alien to that of modern liberalism as these commentators have claimed. As Waldron notes, within liberal political thought, charity is 'a paradigm of a moral duty that ought not to be enforced'. 38 Indeed, the failure of an individual to comply with a duty of charity is perfectly legitimate and would epitomise what Waldron has elsewhere identified as the 'right to do wrong' that defines modern liberalism; a right that can be witnessed in a variety of activities ranging from campaigning for a political candidate one knows to be racist to the refusal to tell someone the time at a bus stop. 39 Within most liberal accounts of political morality, the refusal of charity is such a wrong that we have a right to and therefore an affluent individual has the right to tear to pieces all the money in her wallet rather than give it to a hungry beggar. According to Tully, Simmons, Waldron and others, Locke stands apart from modern liberalism in this regard. Indeed, for them, the entailment of Locke's argument is that it is the beggar (provided she is hungry enough) that holds a property right over the money, not the agent whose wallet it happens to be in at the time. As already noted, scholars like Tully maintain that Locke's idea of charity is Thomistic and non-modern, which implies that any attempts to examine him along liberal lines are doomed to collapse into anachronism.
Despite this, there is evidence that seems to indicate that under Lockean justice some uncharitable actions might be politically permitted without being morally endorsed. In other words, despite Locke's insistence that the obligations of the law of nature are the measure of personal as much as political morality 40 , there is evidence to suggest that he does recognise a 'right to do wrong'. One version of this right can be found in the Second Treatise itself. As discussed above, although individuals have a divine 'command' to labour because the activity satisfies the fundamental duty of human preservation, Locke expects there to be a number of 'Quarrelsome and Contentious' individuals who will shirk this duty. Individuals clearly have a legal right to be lazy even though Locke views laziness as morally wrong. The lazy certainly cannot claim title to the fruits of the labour of others, but their laziness will not be punished (unless, of course, they become a social nuisance).
There are other examples throughout his political works that would appear to lend credence to this interpretation. In his 1667 Essay on Toleration, in a discussion of the issue of begging, Locke identifies acts of charity as the recognition of duties that should (morally) be observed, but need not be (juridically) imposed. In fact, he goes much further than to merely define the failure to engage in charitable acts as a 'right to do wrong':
Even charity itself, which is certainly the great duty both of a man and a Christian, hath not yet, in its full latitude, a universal right to toleration; since there are some parts and instances of it which the magistrate hath absolutely forbidden, and that, for aught I could ever hear, without any offence to the tenderest consciences; for who doubts that to relieve with an alms the poor, though the beggars (if one sees them in want), is, if considered absolutely, a virtue and every particular man's duty; yet this is amongst us prohibited by a law and the rigour of a penalty, and yet nobody in this case complains of the violation of his conscience or the loss of his liberty. 41 Here Locke begins with the suggestion that charity is 'the great duty both of a man and a Christian'. This is, however, immediately tempered: acts of charity do not have 'a universal right to toleration'. His conclusion is that there is nothing wrong with existing legal barriers that act to prevent the giving of alms to a needy beggar. Locke is clear that giving assistance to a needy beggar is a moral duty and a virtuous act, but is equally clear that government can for whatever reason, legitimately outlaw such acts.
It is important to note that this particular passage does not actually reveal anything about Locke's personal views on charity; whether he regards it as a perfect or imperfect moral obligation. Furthermore, this is early in his career, before he gravitated towards the radical Whig political views for which he is best known. And this particular passage was actually omitted from the final draft of the essay of which it is part, which might make it seem especially insignificant. There is further ambiguous evidence about the nature of charity available in 'Venditio', Locke's unpublished essay on just market prices. Here he initially draws a firm distinction between justice and charity with his claim that A man will not sell the same wheat this year under 10s per bushel which the last year he sold for 5s. This is no extortion…because it is this year the market price….If…he will sell his wheat only to the poor at this under rate, this indeed is charity but not what strict justice requires.
The point again seems quite to be quite clear: matters of justice and charity are fundamentally distinct and differ in the kinds of obligation they generate. Charity appears to be a very important virtue for Locke, but the fact that an individual can-in charging however much we want for our goods-transgress charity without at the same time transgressing strict justice, suggests that it is not a perfect obligation but an imperfect one. Selling our goods at market price might be 'wrong', because it causes discomfort for the poor, who struggle to afford them, but it seems to be a 'wrong' that we have a 'right' to in Locke's eyes.
But even here there are ambiguities and although 'Venditio' clearly demonstrates Locke's belief that charity can be an imperfect moral obligation contrastable with perfect obligations of justice, the issue seems to shift when the preservation of human life is at stake. Indeed, towards the end of the essay, Locke declares that …he that sells his corn in a town pressed with famine at the utmost rate he can get for it does no injustice against the common rule of traffic, yet if he carry it away unless they will give him more than they are able, or extorts so much from their present necessity as not to leave them the means of subsistence afterwards, he offends against the common rule of charity as a man and if they perish any of them by reason of his extortion is no doubt guilty of murder. 44 Here, then, Locke suggests that the mere failure to act charitably is equivalent to murder. The question though is: is he guilty of murder as a Christian or as a citizen? Is the guilt part of a religious teleology, which would mean the individual would eventually answer to his or her Creator, or must the individual who transgresses charity instead answer to the magistrate? The law of nature would seem to indicate unequivocally that it is the latter and that the magistrate can intervene to punish the guilty party. But this is still not unambiguously so, as it remains unclear whether or not the corn-seller is under a positive duty to preserve lives or the negative alternative, whereby the corn must not be sold in an extortive manner but need not be sold at a just price, because it need not be sold at all and certainly cannot be appropriated by the needy without the consent of the owner.
IV
This apparent ambiguity in Locke's prescriptive political works demonstrates the need to understand his deployment of the term within the broader context of his religious writings. Taking Locke's religious thought and its context seriously, reveals an alternative conceptualisation of charity that is at once broader than but also able to explain its apparently uncertain use in his account of political justice. Instead of being merely applicable in relation to property transfers, obligatory or supererogatory,
Locke's understanding of charity is dispositional, obligatory as a disposition, and frequently expounded in terms of toleration.
Turning to The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, important signs of
Locke's thought on charity are present. In his discussion of charitable institutions such as hospitals and alms-houses, 45 Locke appears to espouse a typical, liberal understanding of the term: voluntary property transfer in benefit of the afflicted. Put another way, charity is understood as supererogatory outward performance. But this does not put the issue to rest, for Locke is not referring to charity qua charity but to works of charity. This is only an instantiation of the concept and not a general definition of the term.
A crucial section elsewhere in the Essay, Book IV, Chapter 16, proves instructive. Here Locke confronts the sectarian zeal of "parties," which creates dangerous social divisions and ignores standards of rationality. 46 The magnitude of 17 th century religious intolerance shows this is no idle concern. Neal Wood has described Locke's efforts in this part of the Essay at rescuing rationality from sectarian ignorance, further corroborating the significance of this topic. For however some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the splendor of their ritual; others of the reformation of their teaching, and all of the orthodoxy of their faith (for everyone is orthodox to himself): these claims, and others of this kind, are more likely to be signs of men striving for power and empire than signs of the church of Christ. If a man possesses all of these things, but lacks charity, meekness, and good will in general towards all mankind, even towards those who do not profess the Christian faith, he falls short of being a Christian himself. 53 The upshot is that charity and benevolence with humility, like toleration, are the decisive qualities of the true Christian. Locke confirms the intermarriage of charity and toleration, but in so doing the role of this concept becomes more than an expedient against fanaticism. Specifically, charity, including the love of others even when they are in error, is transformed into the definitive Christian virtue. Chillingworth is forcefully recommended for the right reasoning behind his speaking, not to mention 'anything of his argument.' 75 Locke's library tells a similar story. By the time of his death, more than one hundred works by contemporary Latitudinarians and 'many more' by Cambridge Platonists, including More and Cudworth, were shelved in Locke's collection. 76 Suffice it to say that the evidence shows Locke's sustained interest in this dimension of contemporaneous English thought.
Unpacking the theology of these professors and divines shows there was precedent for Locke's understanding of charity. Most importantly, we want to draw attention to several key concepts integral to their understanding of charity which they develop, more or less consistently: first, the centrality of charity as a disposition to Christianity and justification; second, that charity as a disposition is obligatory;
finally, the social ramifications of charity and the important parallel with toleration that these thinkers develop.
In their discussion of charity these Cambridge Platonists and liberal Anglicans consistently place it as a disposition at the centre of Christianity and the question of justification. One of Smith's major claims is that righteousness by faith is not about external performances in accordance with law, but concerns internal life, spiritual
Godliness of the soul and the quickening spirit of the Gospel. 77 Ultimately, "the righteousness of God" amounts to "a Christ-like Nature in a man's Soul, or Christ appearing in the Minds of men by the mighty power of his Divine Spirit... ." 78 Righteousness by faith is not a type of knowledge, a promise, or an outward behaviour; rather, it is a disposition. Cudworth agrees. For him Christianity, while confluent with reason, cannot be coldly cognitive; it must contain a "quickening spirit" or vital life, for the New Law of the Gospel is itself vital. 79 This vital spirit is a kind of laudatory passion or higher love, which Cudworth defines as charity, the "true intellectual instinct", superior love, and the love of honesty. 80 Conceptually Smith and Cudworth's positions regarding charity and the essence of Christianity, match the claims Locke advanced about the dispositional nature of charity and its importance for Christianity.
Precisely because this type of charity is central to these thinkers' Christianity, it is qua disposition that charity is obligatory. Whichcote elaborates the Christian disposition in terms of moral duties. Whoever "professeth faith in the Gospel should live in universal Love and Good-will" -this is "absolutely' necessary in Whichcote's view. 81 Whichcote holds that this attitude is called for by the New Testament more than anything else, remarking that "this cannot be said of very many Points of Divinity." 82 Crucially, this kind of duty cannot be satisfied by outward performances, such as almsgiving:
For it is the choicest Piece of Charity; to make fair Interpretations, and to give Allowance; to make candid Constructions of Mens Actions; to afford civil and courteous Behavior; to be Conversant and Complacent. These Things tend to Love and Good-will among Men… 83 Charity, Christian Love, is played out in these civil behaviours and attitudes. They represent duties both to think well of others and to interact with them beneficently. At the same time, these duties evince the social importance of charity, for all of them are conducive to civic peace. Crucially, and anticipating Locke's understanding, these duties can only be met through a charitable disposition.
A number of these thinkers clearly elucidate the role of this understanding of charity, like Locke, in terms of toleration. Henry More, Whichcote, and
Chillingworth repudiate religious intolerance, worrying that it masks a deeper problem of egotistical love. For More, excessive, singular concern for religious doctrine destroys inward godliness because "Knowledge puffeth up…" unlike charity, which "edifieth." 84 Benjamin Whichcote makes a similar appeal. He worries that zeal for religious truth is really just self-love in disguise, love of "our Fancy," "our Religion," "our own Creatures," and "our own Notions." 85 Chillingworth worries that the Catholic dogma of infallibility and the Church's tendency to condemn and exclude those with different theological opinions has the actual affect of encouraging clerical authorities to substitute self-will for honest biblical interpretation. 86 On the other hand, true Christians are exemplars of tolerance. Whichcote declares:
This I dare undertake is really true of all that are sincere and hearty in their Profession of Religion. And therefore to these there is due, Patience, and Charity. And therefore there is no reason but we may believe that their full assurance of the former Doctrine doth very well qualifie their perswasion of the later; and that the former … are more effectual to temper their hope, and to keep it a stay of a filial and modest assurance of Gods favour, built upon the conscience of his love and fear, than later can be to swell and pff them up into vain confidence and ungrounded presumption. This reason joyn'd with our experience of the honest and religious conversation of many men of this opinion, is a sufficient ground for Charity, to hope well of their Hope: and to assure our selves that it cannot be offensive, but rather most acceptable to God, if, notwithstanding this diversity of opinion, we embrace each other with the strict embraces of love and communion. To you and your Church we leave it, to separate Christians from the Church, and to proscribe them from heaven upon trivial and trifling causes. 
VI
Keeping in mind the conceptual closeness of Locke's thought on charity with that of the latitudinarian and Cambridge-Platonist authors examined above, it is evident that he conceives of charity as a disposition equivalent to toleration and fundamental to Christianity. Although requisite under natural law broadly conceived, it is because Locke's charity is a disposition that it is prior to outward human behaviour and, consequently, necessarily absent from that part of natural law included in Lockean political justice. This accounts for Locke's vacillations when discussing charity within the framework of magisterial enforcement, explaining why the obligation of charity to positively benefit mankind, is only enforced negatively when failure to be charitable produces injurious results.
In order to substantiate this claim, some further analysis of the charity in relation to justice and law in Locke's religious and philosophical thought is required, which both allays anxieties about and specifies the grounding of dispositional charity in Lockean politics. In a crucial passage from Of the Conduct of the Understanding, Locke remarks that the study and practice of theology are the most important, universal duties. He asserts:
There is indeed, one Science (as they are now distinguished) incomparably above all the rest where it is not corruption narrowed into a trade or faction for meane or ill ends and secular interests, I meane Theolgie, which conteining the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to him and our fellow creatures and a view of our present state is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to its true end i.e. the honour and veneration of the Creator and the happynesse of man kinde. This is that noble study which is every man's duty and one that everyone that can be called a rational creature is capable of. Because the duty entailed in Locke's other theological writings adduced here is much the same, if there is anything he thinks natural or divine law require it is charity.
If we accept that charity is the essence of the Gospel, Gospel doctrine is the fullness of God's divine law, divine law equals natural law, and that natural law is preserved in government (all of which Locke maintains), then the theological concept of charity would seem to be transferred into the sphere of Locke's political thought.
But the further claim that charity would be necessity under Lockean political regimes, and anyone who denies it could be punished runs against many of Locke's utterances identified earlier, where acts of charity are morally important but not juridical requirements. There is some perplexity here about the specific relationship between political justice and charity that requires further elaboration.
Taking the dispositional quality of Lockean charity seriously shows the difficulties concerning legally mandatory performances of charitable acts. Obviously such coercion would apply to such uncharitable acts as highway robbery or murder, but the prohibition of these behaviours is always required under natural law and political justice. The interpretive power of this threshold test is that it helps explain juridical action in certain specific cases where a violation of the positive duty to be charitable is at issue. The example from 'Venditio' fits this scenario because, unlike typical criminals, the high prices charged by the corn seller do not necessarily involve an attempt to harm others, only a refusal of positive obligation.
Yet we saw above that Locke identifies the case in 'Venditio' as murder. This is because the failure to help is not distinct from the causing of harm. Here the violation of the positive and negative obligation is one and the same. In such cases, the normal distinction between negative and positive obligations dissolves. In these circumstances Charity is perfectly obligatory as part of political justice and prior to other rights save, preservation of self.
Thus, the political role of charity is predicated by Locke's care in distinguishing between charity as a disposition and the grounds of political obligation and prohibition. Nevertheless, Locke takes charity, in this full sense, to be not only central for Christian ethics but also a universal imperative. This view is not narrowly political but suggestive of the systematic tendencies of his broader thought. Without bringing together these various theoretical concerns, Locke would not have seen that political control contravenes the disposition of charity. Justice and charity cannot collapse into each other without endangering the purposes of both. It is for this reason that charity as a disposition of tolerance and beneficence can only ever be a matter of political justice, and therefore only ever trump property rights, in certain tightly defined circumstances. Thus, Locke's work on charity shows both continuance and the negotiation amongst the philosophical, theological, social and political aspects of his thought. It is often the exceptions to the rule that are most revealing.
